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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction over 
the matter because the Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Issues for Review and Standard of Review 
1. The Third District Court erred in dismissing Pride Stables' Complaint on the 
legal theory of res judicata. 
Because the Third District Court's ruling was a conclusion of law, an appellate 
court reviews that decision for correctness granting no deference to the District 
Court. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989). 
2. The District Court erred in denying Pride Stables' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
An appellate court reviews the Third District Courts denial of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment de novo and all facts presented in the action and all 
inferences to be taken therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 
1991). 
3. The Third District Court erred in refusing to grant Pride Stables' Motion to 
Amend Complaint, when all factual allegations supporting the additional 
1 
Causes of Action were already present in the original Complaint and the record 
demonstrates no prejudice to the Defendants. 
This Court reviews the District Court's denial of the Motion to Amend under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services v. Liberty West, 970 
P.2d 1273, 1281 (Utah 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit involves a golf course known as the Homestead Golf Course in Midway, 
Utah. Plaintiff, Pride Stables ("Pride") is a Utah Limited Partnership. Defendant, 
Homestead Golf Club, Inc., owns the golf course. Defendant Gerald R. Sanders is an 
officer, director, shareholder and employee of Homestead Golf Club, Inc.1 Great Inns of the 
Rockies, Inc. is the majority stockholder in Homestead Golf Club, Inc. Hereinafter, 
Homestead Golf Club, Inc., Sanders and Great Inns of the Rockies, Inc. will be collectively 
referred to as either "Homestead" or "Defendants."2 
During the late 1980's, Pride filed a Chapter 11 reorganization in Federal Bankruptcy 
Court. Thereafter, Pride was approached by Homestead, who proposed to construct a golf 
course upon Pride's property. In consideration for Pride's consent to construct ten (10) holes 
1
 At the time this action was commenced, Sanders was President of Homestead 
Golf Club, Inc. 
2
 The Third District Court entered Orders dismissing the other defendants. (See, 
e.g. R. 34, 323-26, 893-95, 920-23, 933-34). Pride does not appeal from those Orders. 
2 
of the golf course upon its property, Homestead promised to loan Pride $185,000. Pride 
needed the loan to prevent its secured creditors from foreclosing. Based upon the promise 
of that loan, Pride did not seek financing from other lenders. After construction of the golf 
course, Homestead refused to fund the promised loan. 
Without the loan promised by Homestead, Pride was unsuccessful in its efforts to 
avoid foreclosure. In the ensuing foreclosure sales, Homestead purchased all of the Pride 
property upon which the Homestead Golf Course was constructed except for the parcel on 
which the 14th hole was constructed. Consequently, Homestead brought an adversary 
proceeding before the Federal Bankruptcy Court ("Federal Action") to obtain a ruling that 
Pride had granted it a license to use the 14th hole property for construction and operation of 
a golf course. Pride attempted to litigate all of its claims against Homestead in the Federal 
Action. But, based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Homestead obtained an Order 
from the Federal Bankruptcy Court dismissing all of Pride's claims related to property other 
than the 14th hole parcel. Subject matter jurisdiction did not exist as to the non-14th Hole 
Property because it was no longer owned by Pride due to foreclosure. 
In the Federal Action, Homestead admitted that it had promised to loan Pride 
$185,000 in exchange for Pride's consent to construction and operation of the golf course. 
Homestead argued, however, that the promised loan only applied to the property other than 
the 14th hole parcel. Throughout the 1990's, the Federal Action was vigorously litigated. 
There were two trials and multiple appeals, including a decision by the Tenth Circuit in 
Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000), affirming the 
3 
Federal District Court's ruling that Homestead had promised a loan of $ 185,000 to Pride, and 
that Pride had relied upon that loan by giving Homestead permission to construct its golf 
course but that the promise of a loan was too indefinite to be enforced as an express contract. 
The Tenth Circuit specifically stated that its decision did not apply to the non-14th hole 
property. The Tenth Circuit also noted that while no express contract existed with respect 
to the 14th Hole Property, Pride might have been entitled to equitable relief under implied 
contract or promissory estoppel. But the Tenth Circuit refused to consider those alternatives 
to an express contract because they had not been raised before the Federal Bankruptcy Court 
or Federal District Court. 
While the Federal Action was proceeding, Pride commenced the instant lawsuit 
("State Action") against Homestead. Despite the Tenth Circuit's statement that its decision 
did not apply to or affect the non-14th hole property, Homestead moved for summary 
judgment before the Third District Court on the basis of the Federal Action. Homestead 
argued that the State Action was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The Third District 
Court granted Homestead's Motion. As a result of the Third District Court's decision, 
Homestead has a golf course and Pride has nothing. 
B. PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Pride filed its Complaint in the "State Action" on December 14, 1989. (R. 1). The 
case remained active until the end of 1991 when the parties tacitly entered into a stand still 
agreement in order to concentrate on pursuing their respective claims in the "Federal 
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Action." The Federal Bankruptcy Court had no jurisdiction over the property involved in the 
State Action. 
After the Federal Action was finally resolved in 2000, Pride filed a. Motion for Leave 
to Amend its Complaint in 2001. The Third District Court denied that Motion. (R. 1204). 
Subsequently, Homestead filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Pride filed a Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Third District Court granted Homestead's 
Motion based upon the doctrine of res judicata but it denied Pride's Cross-Motion. (R. 
1506). Pride then filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. 1517). 
C. MATERIAL FACTS 
Many of the following facts are taken from the record in the Federal Action including 
the Tenth Circuit Court's decision reported at Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, 
224 F.3d 1195, 1198-99 (10th Or. 2000). Pride submits that res judicata applies to many of 
the findings made in the Federal Action and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Specifically, findings related to the fact that Homestead did promise the $185,000 loan to 
Pride in exchange for Pride's consent and assistance in construction of the golf course. A 
copy of the Tenth Circuit's opinion is included in the Addendum. 
Homestead was organized to construct a golf course in Midway, Utah. Homestead, 
224 F. 3d at 1198. Pride Stables owned a 50% interest in the two parcels of property upon 
which 10 holes of the golf course were to be built. The first parcel is known as the "14th 
Hole Property"'and was the subject of the Federal Action. Id. The second parcel was co-
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owned by Cal Clark and is known as the "Clark-Pride Property." Id. The Clark-Pride 
Property is the parcel involved in the State Action. 
In February of 1987, Homestead approached Pride to obtain the right to use portions 
of the Clark-Pride Property and the 14th Hole Property for the construction and operation 
of a golf course. Id. By Spring 1988, however, Pride was in default on loans secured by the 
Clark-Pride Property. Pride filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in 
order to forestall foreclosure and was pursuing forbearance agreements with its creditors. 
(Id; R. 1336). Homestead's Vice President, Lem Stroud, knew that the Clark-Pride 
Property was encumbered by trust deeds and other liens. Stroud likewise knew that Pride 
would need to make payments on these encumbrances during the course of construction of 
the golf course in order to avoid foreclosure. Stroud also encouraged Pride to seek 
forbearance agreements from its creditors. (R. 1336, 1399). 
In late February of 1988, Homestead represented to Pride in writing that the 
construction and operation of the proposed golf course on a portion of Pride's property 
would greatly increase the value of the remaining Pride property adjacent to the golf course. 
Homestead represented that if the golf course were constructed the value of Pride's real 
property adjoining the golf course would increase in value from approximately $150,000 to 
more than $6 million. (R. 1366-67). 
Homestead's President, Sanders, told Pride that it was important for Homestead to get 
a Letter of Commitment from Pride authorizing Homestead's construction of the golf course 
upon Pride's property. Homestead needed that Letter of Commitment in order to begin the 
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construction of its golf course. The City of Midway, Utah required that Letter before it 
would issue a building permit for the golf course. (R. 1407). In return for the promised loan 
of $185,000, Homestead requested Pride to sign this Letter of Commitment? In reliance 
upon those representations, Pride agreed to let Homestead use a portion of its property for 
the construction and operation of a golf course. {Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 1367, 
1399). In the Federal Action, the parties stipulated in the Pretrial Order to the following 
incontroverted fact: "Plaintiff [Homestead] and Defendant [Pride Stables] orally agreed 
that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make 
payment to certain of its secured creditors." (R. 1352). During the course of the Federal 
Action, Homestead took the position that this promise to loan Pride $185,000 related only 
to the Clark-Pride Property. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1201. 
As a result of these promises, on June 15, 1988, Pride and the other co-owner of the 
Clark-Pride Property signed the Letter of Commitment prepared by Homestead's attorney 
allowing Homestead to begin construction of the golf course. (Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; 
R. 846-48, 857,1398-1403). Based upon that Letter of Commitment, the City of Midway, 
Utah granted a permit and Homestead began construction. (Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; 
3
 Homestead's Vice President, Stroud, who negotiated on behalf of Homestead, 
admitted in latter depositions that he felt he owed a fiduciary duty to Pride and that he 
had represented to Pride that if Pride would allow Homestead to use its property, Pride 
would be "morally, legally and otherwise protected in their dealings." (R. 1404-07). 
Neither Stroud nor Homestead honored that commitment, however. 
7 
R. 1400).4 In granting that permit for construction of the golf course, the City of Midway's 
planning commission imposed as a condition upon Homestead that all necessary easement 
and legal agreements from participating property owners be obtained and submitted to the 
City Planner prior to any construction being started. 
Following its receipt of that Letter of Commitment from the Clark-Pride Property 
owners, Homestead issued a check in the sum of $5,000 to one of Pride's secured creditors 
for the purpose of forestalling foreclosure on a portion of the Clark-Pride Property. (R. 
1353,1368). The Federal Bankruptcy Court specifically found that this money represented 
part of the loan which Homestead had agreed to make to Pride. (Id). After Homestead 
substantially completed the construction of a golf course, it refused to make the balance of 
the agreed loan unless Pride obtained the subordination of the loans of its secured creditors. 
Specifically, Homestead would not provide the $180,000 loan balance to Pride unless Pride 
obtained agreements from its secured creditors on the Clark-Pride Property to subordinate 
their claims to those of Homestead. (Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198; R. 1370, 1395). 
The issue of subordination was the subject of extensive litigation in the Federal 
Action and the Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Homestead knew Pride was dependent 
upon the loan to obtain forbearance from its creditors and that Homestead's failure to fund 
the agreed loan would result and did result in Pride's loss of the property. (R. 1370). The 
Federal Bankruptcy Court expressly found that Homestead had induced Pride to permit 
4
 Construction of the golf course resulted in significant destruction of Pride's 
property. (R. 858). 
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construction of the golf course by representing it would loan Pride $185,000 to enable Pride 
to avoid foreclosure by its secured creditors and that Pride had reasonably relied upon that 
representation by executing the Letter of Commitment. (R. 1372). It is also undisputed that 
in reliance upon the promised loan from Homestead, Pride never sought an alternative source 
of funding for the forbearance agreements with its secured creditors. (R. 1400). 
The Federal Bankruptcy Court went on to conclude that the loan agreement between 
Homestead and Pride did not require Pride to obtain subordination of its other secured 
creditors to Homestead's loan and that the requirement of subordination was not part of the 
loan agreement. (R. 1369 and 1373). The Federal Bankruptcy Court also specifically found 
that despite the fact that it was not required to do so under the original agreement between 
the parties, Pride attempted in good faith to obtain subordination from its creditors but was 
unsuccessful. Id. 
The Federal B ankruptcy Court concluded, as a matter of law, that Homestead's refusal 
to make the promised loan to Pride without the subordination of Pride's secured creditors 
was an anticipatory repudiation of the loan agreement between them. (R. 1373). The Federal 
District Court affirmed the Federal Bankruptcy Court on this issue (R. 1396). The Federal 
District Court was in turn affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1198. 
In its Memorandum, Opinion and Order affirming the Federal Bankruptcy Court's 
decision, the Federal District Court found that Homestead knew Pride's creditors would not 
agree to subordinate. The District Court likewise found that "by suggesting that the loan 
agreement could go ahead only if Pride obtained subordination agreements of all the lien 
9 
holders, including Davis County Bank - a creditor that in no uncertain terms stated it 
would not subordinate - HGC [Homestead] eflfectively created an impossibility of 
performance." (R. 1395). Based upon its review of the record, the Federal District Court 
affirmed the Federal Bankruptcy Court's decision that Homestead had anticipatorily 
repudiated its promise of a $185,000 loan to Pride with respect to the demand for 
subordination: "HGC [Homestead] was requesting (1) a performance it was not entitled 
to under the agreement; and (2) a performance HGC knew would be impossible for 
Pride to accomplish." (R. 1396). The Federal District Court also found that there was no 
express contract between the parties, which was another basis for affirming the Federal 
Bankruptcy Court. (R. 1386). 
After foreclosure, Homestead purchased from Pride's creditors those portions of the 
Clark-Pride Property upon which its golf course was constructed. Homestead then 
commenced the Federal Action to obtain the 14th Hole Property. When Homestead 
commenced the Federal Action, Pride attempted to litigate all of the issues involving the golf 
course, both the 14th Hole Property and the Clark-Pride Property. Pride attempted to do this 
by way of a Counterclaim. However, Homestead and other parties in the Federal Action 
moved to dismiss the Counterclaim and the Federal Bankruptcy Court granted ih^t Motion. 
Pride's Counterclaim with respect to the Clark-Pride Property was dismissed without 
prejudice based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R. 1414-18). 
10 
The Federal Bankruptcy Court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist 
over the Clark-Pride Property claims because Pride no longer owned this land. Pride's 
creditors had foreclosed upon the Clark-Pride Property, which meant that Pride's claims 
related to this land did not arise under the Federal Bankruptcy Code nor did they involve a 
core proceeding arising under Federal Bankruptcy Code. Due to the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property, the Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that its decision 
related only to the 14th Hole Property and "[did] not preclude any pending or future 
actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-Pride Property" Homestead, 224 F. 
3d at 1201 n. 7. 
The Federal Action was concluded on September 12, 2000, when the Tenth Circuit 
issued its final decision. Pride filed its Motion to Amend in the State Action approximately 
ore year later. (R. 975). This proposed Amended Complaint stated Causes of Action for 
breach of implied contract based upon part performance, promissory estoppel, intentional 
interference with economic relations, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and fraud. (R. 978-97). These Causes of Action were all either explicitly set forth 
in Pride's original Complaint, or were fully supported by Pride's allegations in its original 
Complaint. (R. 1-23, 978-97). 
Specifically, in its Complaint, Pride made the following allegations: 
On or about March 9,1988, Plaintiff informed Defendants (other than Valley) 
that, as a condition precedent to granting the permission requested by said 
Defendants to build the said Golf Course on portions of Plaintiff s property, 
Plaintiff needed sufficient funds to obtain the forbearance of Valley and other 
secured creditors from foreclosure during a period of two years or more during 
11 
the construction of the golf course and pending the development and sale of 
Plaintiffs properties adjoining the proposed golf course. 
* * * 
During May and June of 1988, in reliance upon the representation of 
Defendants (other than Valley) that the loan of $185,000 would be made 
promptly, Plaintiff orally agreed with said Defendants to grant Homestead 
a license to construct a large portion of its proposed golf course upon 
portions of Plaintiff's properties in consideration of the said loan. 
* * * 
Based upon the said oral agreements . . . and in partial performance of said 
oral agreement, Plaintiffs' general partner executed a letter addressed to 
Midway City, Utah in the form prepared and requested by said Defendants 
. . . to assist him in obtaining a permit from the City of Midway for the 
construction of the said golf course, and Defendants did in fact use that 
letter to obtain a building permit and promptly thereafter began the 
construction of the golf course. 
* * * 
[Defendants have failed and refused to perform the oral agreement to 
make the said loan and to execute the proposed written agreement and 
have failed and refused to provide Plaintiff with any part of said loan save 
and except for the sum of $5,000 which was advanced to Plaintiffs on or 
about July 7,1988. 
* # * 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid . . . breach of the oral agreement by said 
Defendants... Defendants proceeded to occupy portions of Plaintiffs9 lands 
and have entered into a series of contracts with third persons for 
construction work and materials and have induced and directed third 
persons to enter upon Plaintiffs9 land and to construct substantial portions 
of Defendants9 proposed golf course on Plaintiffs' land and have cut down 
trees, removed topsoil, created road, dug trenches, removed fences, re-
contoured land, installed signs and utilized the property for the storage 
and use of construction equipment and materials. Said Defendants 
fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to take no immediate legal action against such 
intrusions and use of Plaintiffs' property by continuing to negotiate with 
12 
Plaintiffs and by representing that their promises would be performed, but in 
fact said Defendants did not intend to perform the oral contract or to execute 
and perform the proposed written contract. 
# # * 
By reason of the foregoing, Defendants . • • have occupied and used large 
portions of Plaintiffs' properties without paying the agreed consideration, 
have damaged the property and, by reason of withholding the promised 
funds, have denied Plaintiff the ability to obtain a forbearance of its 
secured creditors in order to preclude foreclosure of the deeds of trust 
applicable to Plaintiffs' lands. 
# * * 
By reason of the foregoing Plaintiff was unable to provide its secured 
creditors with consideration for the forbearance of their rights to foreclose 
and Valley, despite its previous agreement to forebear if furnished 
consideration from the funds to be loaned by Defendant to Plaintiff, has 
foreclosed and purchased substantial portions of Plaintiff's property at 
foreclosure sales. 
(R. 5-8)(emphasis added).5 The foregoing allegations state claims for breach of implied 
contract and promissory estoppel. 
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the doctrines of promissary estoppel 
and partial performance "might allow a remedy where no formal contract exists." But the 
Tenth Circuit did not apply either doctrine because "Pride... did not advance arguments 
based upon these theories until its Reply Brief..." Homestead, 224 F. 3d at 1202 fn. 9. 
However, despite that acknowledgment from the Tenth Circuit and holding that its decision 
only applied to the 14th Hole Property, the Third District Court denied Pride's Motion to 
5
 Although not expressly identified as such, these allegations establish a claim for 
partial performance and promissory estoppel. See infra discussion at page 25. 
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Amend its Complaint The Third District Court denied Pride's Motion to Amend based upon 
the doctrine of res judicata and alleged prejudice to the Defendants. (R. 1204, 1212). 
Homestead filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1322). Pride filed a Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on its First and Eighth Causes of Action to establish 
liability on the part of Homestead as to these claims, leaving only damages to be tried. (R. 
1419). The Third District Court denied Pride's Cross-Motion and granted Homestead's 
Motion based upon res judicata. (R. 1502-1511). Pride appealed from the decisions of the 
Third District Court. (R. 1517). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the decision of the Third District Court and remand the case 
for further proceedings because the Third District Court erred in concluding that res judicata 
operated to bar Pride's Causes of Action against Homestead. Res Judicata does not apply 
to this case because the Courts in the Federal Action on which Homestead bases its argument 
of res judicata never had subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property. Further, 
the Federal Bankruptcy Court, Federal District Court and Tenth Circuit Court in the Federal 
Action never considered the arguments advanced by Pride in this State Action case, namely 
equitable alternatives for enforcing contracts not based on the existence of an express formal 
contract. 
The Third District Court erred, too, by failing to grant Pride's Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. The Courts in the Federal Action have made all the factual 
predicate determinations that Homestead breached an implied contract based upon part 
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performance and that Pride is entitled to recovery on the basis of promissory estoppel. 
Because these factual determinations have already been made, Pride was entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law on the liability portion of those implied contract and promissory estoppel 
claims, leaving only damages for trial. 
Finally, the District Court abused its discretion by refusing Pride leave to amend its 
Complaint. The Third District Court incorrectly concluded that res judicata barred the 
claims made by Pride in the proposed Amended Complaint. Further, the record does not 
support the Third District Court's statement that Homestead would be prejudiced by the 
Amended Complaint. Hence, the Third District Court's denial of Pride's Motion was an 
abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
RES JUDICATA OPERATED TO BAR PRIDE'S CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS 
The Third District Court incorrectly concluded that Pride's Causes of Action for 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud were 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In its Memorandum Decision, the Third District 
Court stated: 
The plaintiffs first cause of action for breach of contract and eighth 
cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
which depends on an enforceable contract, are based upon the same agreement 
that the 10th Circuit Court ruled was never completed by the parties. 
Therefore, it is clear that the 10th Circuit Court ruling that there was no 
agreement between the parties bars these causes of action. Although plaintiff 
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argues that its causes of action included claims based upon part performance 
and promissory estoppel, the plaintiff has not pled them. 
As to plaintiff's ninth cause of action for fraud, the plaintiff alleges 
that defendants' promise to loan money to plaintiff was fraudulent, in that 
defendants had no intention of making the loan at the time they agreed to 
do so.6 While an enforceable contract is not required for an action in fraud, 
the plaintiffs fraud claim is based upon the defendants' failure to perform 
under the alleged agreement which was addressed by the 10th Circuit opinion. 
The plaintiffs fraud claim is asserted on the basis that the parties had an 
agreement. It appears clear that one cannot base a fraud claim on a failure to 
perform an agreement where the court has found no agreement exists. Based 
upon that, the plaintiff is barred by die res judicata effect of the 10th Circuit 
opinion as to its fraud claim as well. 
(R. 1502-03)(emphasis added). The Third District Court incorrectly applied the doctrine. 
"The doctrine of res judicata has two branches, claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion." PGM, Inc. v. Westchester Inv. Partners, Ltd, 2000 UT App 2014, 995 P.2d 
1252 at 1254. The Third District Court failed to enunciate which of the two branches it 
applied to the facts of this case and, accordingly, it failed to adequately address the separate 
elements of each branch. Therefore, Pride will discuss each branch. For issue preclusion 
to apply, the party advocating application of the doctrine must prove the following: 
First the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, 
and completely litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is 
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or 
a privy of a party. 
6
 It is clear from this language that the Third District Court recognized that the 
basis of Pride's fraud claim was not the existence of a contract between Pride and 
Homestead, but Homestead's fraudulent promise to loan money in exchange for Pride's 
assistance in the construction and operation of the golf course. The significance of this 
recognition is discussed in more detail infra at page 23. 
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Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). 
For claim preclusion to apply, the party advocating application of the doctrine must 
prove the following: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Id. at 247 (emphasis added). Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion applies to the 
facts of this case because the issues involved in the State Action were not fully and fairly 
litigated in the Federal Action. More importantly, because the Federal Bankruptcy Court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property, the issues in the State 
Action related to that property could not have been litigated in the Federal Action. 
Three undisputed facts exist which undermine the Third District Court's decision 
regarding res judicata: (1) Pride attempted to fully litigate the case in the Federal Action, 
however, based upon iht Motion of Defendants the Federal Bankruptcy Court refused to hear 
claims regarding the Clark-Pride Property for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, 
the Federal Courts only determined the rights of the parties regarding the 14th Hole Property; 
Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1201 n.7; (2) the Federal Action did not address issues 
concerning detrimental reliance or partial performance Id. at 1202 n.9; and (3) the Federal 
Action did not resolve any issues surrounding Pride's allegations of fraud against the 
Defendants. Id. at 1202-03. These undisputed facts demonstrate that the issues regarding 
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the Clark-Pride Property were not fully and fairly litigated in the Federal Action, nor could 
they have been litigated. 
A. Pride Was Not Allowed to Litigate All Issues Regarding the Clark-Pride 
Property in the Federal Action. 
Pride made an effort to litigate all of the issues involving the Homestead Golf Course 
Property in the Federal Action (both the Hole-14 Property and the Clark-Pride Property) by 
way of Counterclaim. However, Homestead moved to dismiss the Counterclaim. The 
Federal Bankruptcy Court granted that Motion and dismissed Pride's Counterclaim with 
respect to the Clark-Pride Property "without prejudice" based upon the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. (R. 1414-18). The Federal Bankruptcy Court concluded that subject 
matter jurisdiction did not exist over the Clark-Pride Property claims because Pride no 
longer owned this land. Pride's creditors had foreclosed upon the Clark-Pride Property, 
which meant that Pride's claims related to this land did not arise under the Federal 
Bankruptcy Code nor did they involve a core proceeding arising under Federal Bankruptcy 
Code. Therefore, during the entire course of the Federal Action, the Clark-Pride Property 
was outside the purview of the Federal Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction and no decisions 
made in the Federal Action effected the Clark Pride Property. See e.g. United States v. 51 
Pieces of Real Estate Property Roswell, New Mexico, 17 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(concluding that orders and judgments entered with respect to property over which a court 
has no subject matter jurisdiction are void and unenforceable). 
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The Tenth Circuit expressly recognized this fact when it stated: "Because the scope 
of the complaint and subsequent finding of the bankruptcy court are limited to the 
fourteenth hole property, we do not address whether the parties entered into an 
agreement or contract relative to the Clark-Pride property- Our decision therefore does 
not preclude any pending or future actions involving claims relevant only to the Clark-
Pride property." Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1201 n.7. Thus, not only did Pride not 
have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate issues related to the Clark-Pride Property, it 
was affirmatively prevented from doing so, in large part due to Homestead's successful 
Motion to Dismiss Pride's Counterclaim. For this reason, a critical element of both branches 
of res judicata is missing (ie. opportunity to fully and fairly litigate) and Pride should be 
allowed to pursue its claims in reference to the Clark-Pride Property. 
1. Homestead's Claims of Res Judicata Are Barred by Judicial 
Estoppel. 
Homestead argued with success in the Federal Action that the Federal Bankruptcy 
Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Clark-Pride Property. Since 
Homestead prevailed on that Motion, it cannot now claim that Pride had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate its claims concerning that property in the Federal Action. Having 
made and prevailed on that Motion, Homestead is judicially estopped from asserting in this 
State Action that Pride's Clark-Pride Property claims were tried or should have been tried 
in the Federal Action. In other words, since the Federal Bankruptcy Court granted 
Homestead's Motion to Dismiss in the Federal Action, Homestead is judicially estopped 
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from asserting the Affirmative Defense of res judicata in the State Action. See Condas v. 
Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980) (holding that "it is well settled that a party who 
has taken a position in a prior litigation and has obtained relief on the basis of it cannot 
maintain the opposite position in another action"). 
B. Pride's Claims for Breach of Implied Contract Based upon Part 
Performance and Promissory Estoppel Are Not Barred by Res Judicata 
Because the Federal Action Did Not Address Those Causes of Action. 
Defendants farther claim that Pride's Causes of Action are barred by res judicata 
because the facts underlying both the 14th Hole Property and the Clark-Pride Property are 
similar, if not identical. However, the record reveals that the claims set forth by Pride in the 
State Action were not resolved in the Federal Action. As stated above, the Tenth Circuit 
expressly stated that its ruling did not apply to the Clark-Pride Property and that the parties 
were free to pursue Causes of Action concerning that property in other forums. Furthermore, 
the Tenth Circuit made clear that it was presented solely with the question of whether there 
was an express contract between the parties. The Tenth Circuit did not evaluate or determine 
whether alternatives to an express contract, such as detrimental reliance and/or part 
performance, would provide a remedy to Pride, particularly as to the Clark-Pride Property, 
because those issues were not before the Court. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit stated: 
We do not address the merits of Pride's reply brief contention that it is entitled 
to relief pursuant to the doctrines enunciated in Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §§ 34 and 69(2) (1979). See Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 
F.2d 716, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that issues raised for the first time in 
the reply brief will not be considered). Ordinarily, detrimental reliance 
might allow a remedy where no formal contract exists, or, alternatively, 
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partial performance might support a finding of an enforceable contract. 
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34 (1979). Pride, however, did not 
advance arguments based on these theories until its reply brief, although it did 
place in play the doctrinally independent concept of equitable estoppel. 
Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1202 n.9 (emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit thus recognized that had the issues of detrimental reliance 
(promissory estoppel) and part performance been before it, those doctrines may have 
provided a remedy as to the 14th Hole Property despite its conclusions that no "formal 
contract" existed. But, because the Clark-Pride Property was not within the jurisdiction of 
the Tenth Circuit and because the Tenth Circuit did not determine whether issues of part 
performance or detrimental reliance created an enforceable "contract" or promise between 
the parties, neither branch of res judicata applied to bar the Third District Court from 
resolving these issues.7 
1. The Issues of Part Performance and Promissory Estoppel Were 
Appropriately Pled in the Complaint 
The Third District Court concluded that the issues of part performance and 
detrimental reliance were not appropriately before it and as such it based its decision solely 
7
 There is one additional fact that makes the cases dissimilar. Specifically, in the 
Federal Action, Homestead claimed that the loan agreement or contract related only to 
the Clark-Pride Property, while Pride contended that the loan covered both parcels of 
property. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1200 ("HGC [Homestead] claims the loan related 
only to the Clark-Pride Property, but Pride alleges the loan was supported by HGC's 
USA of both the Clark-Pride and the 14-Hole Properties"). The United States District 
Court accepted Homestead's contention about the loan agreement relating solely to the 
Clark-Pride Property and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. This fact alone is sufficient to 
demonstrate that the facts underlying this action differ enough from the Federal Action 
that res judicata does not apply. 
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on whether an actual formal contract existed between the parties, the issue which was 
decided in the Federal Action. However, a careful reading of the original Complaint in this 
matter (R. 1-32), reveals that the facts supporting these Causes of Action were included in 
the Complaint and, therefore, should have been discussed and reviewed by the district court. 
Pride does not dispute that it cannot in this action pursue a theory that there was an express 
formal contract between the parties. This would be subject to res judicata since the parties 
agree that the 14th Hole Property and the Clark-Pride Property were both part of the same 
negotiations and transactions. However, Pride's allegations in its Complaint go beyond 
merely alleging the creation of an express formal contract, they discuss the creation of a 
contract through part performance or alternatively the enforceability of a promise through 
promissory estoppel. When Pride's First Cause of Action for breach of contract and its 
Eighth Cause of Action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are 
reviewed under that lens, it becomes apparent that the Tenth Circuit opinion has no effect 
on those Causes of Action and they would not be subject to res judicata. 
C. The District Court Erred in Determining That Res Judicata Applied to 
Pride's Fraud Claim. 
Similarly, the Third District Court incorrectly concluded that res judicata operated 
to bar Pride's claim for fraud. The District Court based its decision on the mistaken assertion 
that the basis of the claim was that the "parties had an agreement" (R. 1503), and because 
there was no agreement, as concluded in the Federal Action, the fraud claim was barred by 
res judicata. Such a decision takes a far too limited view of Pride's Complaint. 
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Pride based its Cause of Action for fraud on the fact that there is evidence of 
Homestead's intent not to honor the promise of a loan to Pride when Homestead knew not 
orfy that Pride was relying upon that loan but that Pride would lose its property to 
foreclosure if the loan was not made. Homestead's intent in this matter is revealed by the 
Letter of Commitment. Homestead knew prior to obtaining that Letter of Commitment from 
Pride that Pride's creditors would not subordinate. (R. 1337, 1412-13). Subordination was 
not part of the promise to loan which Homestead made to Pride. Nevertheless, after 
obtaining the Letter of Commitment to allow it to construct the golf course, Homestead 
imposed the condition of subordination upon Pride, knowing that it would be impossible for 
Pride to perform. This would certainly support a claim of fraud against Homestead on behalf 
of Pride since under Utah law, a statement of a future intention is actionable if a fraudulent 
intention existed at the time the deceitful statement was made. See Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 
607 P.2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980). 
Furthermore, an enforceable contract is not required to support a fraud claim in Utah. 
Under Utah law, any promise accompanied by present intention not to perform, made for 
purpose of deceiving the promisee, thereby inducing him to act where otherwise he would 
not have done so and by virtue of which he parts with his money or some other property, is 
actionable deceit. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Ventura Number One, 645 P.2d 608, 611 
(Utah 1982). In this case, it was fraud based upon the promise of a loan which Pride seeks 
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to litigate, not fraud based upon an actual enforceable agreement between the parties.8 
Therefore, the Third District Court incorrectly concluded that res judicata barred Pride's 
fraud claim. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PRIDE'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS BREACH 
OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
In concluding that res judicata operated to bar Pride's Cause of Action in this case, 
the Third District Court also denied Pride's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Because res judicata did not apply the Third District Court should have considered and 
granted Pride's Motion. Pride was entitled to partial summary judgment under sections 34 
and 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as well as under the theory of promissory 
estoppel. Both parties admit and the Federal Bankruptcy Court found that Homestead agreed 
to loan Pride $185,000 in exchange for Pride allowing Homestead to build a golf course on 
its land. The Pretrial Order entered in the Federal Action even lists as an incontroverted 
fact that "on or about May 9,1988 Plaintiff [HGC] and Defendant [Pride] oraUy agreed 
that Plaintiff would lend Defendant the sum of $185,000 so that Defendant could make 
payment to certain of its secured creditors."9 (Emphasis added.")- It is undisputed that this 
8
 As previously noted, the Third District Court's Memorandum Decision 
acknowledges that Pride's fraud claim was based upon the promise of a loan which 
Homestead had no intention of honoring. See supra at page 16. 
9
 According to the Tenth Circuit, Homestead claimed that the loan agreement or 
contract related only to the Clark-Pride Property, while Pride contended that the loan 
covered both parcels of property. Homestead, 224 F.3d at 1200 
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promise was made. The Tenth Circuit opinion also makes clear that Homestead gave Pride 
a check in the amount of $5,000 in furtherance of this promise/agreement. Homestead Golf 
Club, 224 F.3d at 1198. It is undisputed, too, that Pride relied upon Homestead's promise 
of a $185,000 loan by executing the Letter of Commitment, permitting Homestead to 
construct its golf course upon portions of Pride's property, and by not seeking another source 
of financing to fund the forbearance agreements it was attempting to negotiate with creditors. 
Finally, it is also undisputed that Homestead refused to loan Pride the money at the critical 
point in its negotiations with creditors; that creditors foreclosed upon the Clark-Pride 
Property; and that Homestead purchased, as it intended, portions of the Clark-Pride Property 
from those foreclosing creditors. Under these undisputed or already established facts, Pride 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Homestead's promise to loan Pride the money is enforceable as an implied contract.10 
An implied contract is found when there is no express contract but the conduct of the parties 
is such that the law implies an enforceable contract. Consequently, a finding that there is no 
express contract is not inconsistent with formation of a contract through conduct of the 
parties. SeeBarwickPacific Carpet Co. v. KamHawaii Construction Inc., 630P.2d 638,641 
(Hawaii App. 1981). See also Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator Supplies Co., 272P .2d 583, 
584 (Utah 1954) (recognizing the principle of contract formation through conduct of the 
10
 As detailed above, the Tenth Circuit's decision that the promise of a loan to 
Pride was too indefinite to be enforced as an express contract would not be a bar to 
Pride's pursuit of and recovery under an implied contract claim against Homestead 
related to the Clark-Pride Property. 
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parties). Even the Tenth Circuit Court recognized that Sections 34 and 69(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts may have provided Pride with an alternative remedy to 
a finding of an express contract. Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1202 n.9. Pursuant to 
these sections of the Restatement, Pride is entitled to a ruling that an implied contract based 
upon reliance and part performance existed between the parties and that Homestead breached 
that agreement by its anticipatory repudiation. 
Section 34 provides that "part performance on an agreement may remove uncertainty 
and establish that a contract enforceable as a bargain has been formed" and that "action in 
reliance on an agreement may make a contractual remedy appropriate even though 
uncertainty is not removed." (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34). Section 34 is, in 
other words, a gap-filling provision employed when the terms of the agreement are too 
indefinite to constitute an express contract as in this case. See Lo Bosco v. Kure Engineering 
ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (D.N.J. 1995). 
In the instant case., Pride fully performed by allowing Homestead to construct and 
operate its golf course on the Clark-Pride Property and, most important of all, by signing the 
Letter of Commitment, without which Homestead could never have constructed its golf 
course. That an implied contract exists in this instance is further shown by the fact that after 
receipt of the Letter of Commitment, Homestead paid $5,000 to prevent one of Pride's 
creditors from foreclosing upon a portion of the Clark-Pride Property and by the position 
Homestead took in the Federal Action that its promise of a loan related solely to the Clark-
Pride Property. 
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Section 69(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts likewise triggers an implied 
contract. This section provides that: 
An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offerer's 
ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the 
offered terms unless they are manifestly unreasonable. . . 
(Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(2)). The same facts that would sustain an implied 
contract under Section 34 of the Restatement, would do so under Section 69(2). In addition, 
Homestead took possession of Pride's property and did so pursuant to a promise that it would 
loan $185,000 to Pride so that Pride could avoid foreclosure. Pride respectfully submits, 
therefore, that Homestead's promise of a loan is enforceable under Section 69(2) of the 
Restatement.11 See Russel v. Texas Co., 238 F.2d 636, 642 (9th Cir. 1956) (recognizing that 
exercise or dominion over the thing offered constitutes acceptance); Crouch v. Marrs, 430 
P.2d 204,209 (Kan. 1967) (same); Warrior Constructors, Inc., v. Small Business Investment 
Co. of Houston, 536 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (same). 
Pride is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its claim for promissory 
estoppel. As with the part performance theory, the Tenth Circuit likewise noted that 
Homestead's promise of funding might be enforceable under a promissory estoppel or 
11
 If the Court enforces Homestead's promise of a loan to Pride as an implied 
contract, then Homestead clearly breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing that is the basis of Pride's Eighth Cause of Action. In fact, the Federal District 
Court specifically found that by refusing to loan Pride the money without subordination 
agreements from Pride's secured creditors, "HGC [Homestead] effectively created the 
impossibility of performance." (R. 1395). Pride respectfully submits that such a finding 
is, as a matter of law, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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detrimental alliance theory based upon Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 
But like the other possible Restatement remedies, Section 90 was not considered by the 
Tenth Circuit because (with respect to the 14th Hole Property) it had not been timely raised 
by Pride. As previously noted, however, that does not preclude Pride's assertion of 
detrimental reliance as to the Clark-Pride Property since that property was not before the 
Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
This fact is significant because promissory estoppel is only available as a remedy in 
the absence of an otherwise enforceable contract. See Scott Co. ofCal v. MK-Ferguson Co., 
832 P.2d 1000,1003 (Colo. App. 1991). See also Easton v. Wycojf, 295 P.2d 332,334 (Utah 
1956) (promissory estoppel appropriate when agreement lacks consideration and is therefore 
not a binding contract). In other words, it takes a finding of no express contract to trigger 
a claim for promissory estoppel. 
The purpose of promissory estoppel is to enable courts to enforce contract-like 
promises made unenforceable by technical defects or defenses. See Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 
1,10 (Alaska 1998). The key to this non-contractual claim is a promise on which a party has 
relied to his or her its detriment. The elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise that 
the promissor reasonably expects will induce reliance, (2) reasonable reliance inducing 
action or forbearance by promisee, and (3) detriment to the promisee. See Prows v. State, 
822 P. 2d 764, 768-69 (Utah 1991). All such elements of promissory estoppel were pled in 
Pride's First Cause of Action. Further, all such elements were found in the Federal Action. 
Specifically, the facts elicited in the parties' stipulation established that Homestead promised 
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to loan Pride $185,000. The Tenth Circuit opinion also establishes that Pride relied on this 
promise to its detriment. Under these undisputed facts, even if the Court finds there was no 
implied contract between the parties, Pride is still entitled to a partial summary judgment 
establishing Homestead's liability for breach of a promise of funding, leaving only damages 
for trial. See First National Bank of Logan Sport v. Logan Manufacturing Co., Inc., 577 
N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1991)(even though not enforceable as an express contract, promise of a 
loan was enforceable under doctrine of promissory estoppel). For these reasons the Third 
District Court erred in denying Pride's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PRIDE'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT WHEN ALL THE 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS SUPPORTING THE SUPPLEMENTAL 
CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PLED IN THE COMPLAINT 
The Third District Court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Pride to amend 
its Complaint. When a plaintiff presents a court with a Motion for Leave to Amend its 
Complaint, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that "leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires.'' Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). As the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized: "Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to the end that cases may be 
fully and fairly presented on their merits." Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 
408 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). It is within this framework that this Court should 
review the Third District Court's Order denying Pride's Morion to Amend. 
The Third District Court denied Pride's Motion to Amend on two primary theories: 
(1) that the Motion was "untimely and that untimeliness has prejudiced Defendants"; and (2) 
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that res judicata barred all amended Causes of Action.12 (R. 1213). In determining that the 
Motion was untimely the Third District Court stated: 
This lawsuit was filed 12 years ago. All parties agree that the discovery was 
completed in the early years of this lawsuit. Since the time of the filing and 
completion of discovery, the person alleged to have been the principal 
wrongdoer, L.L. Stroud, has died. Even though he testified in earlier 
proceedings and was deposed, plaintiff has alleged new causes of action which 
cannot now be explored. Additionally, while the federal court action may 
have caused some delay in these proceedings, the federal lawsuit was 
completed September 12, 2000. Plaintiff makes no explanation for the 
fourteen month delay before it filed its Motion in the lawsuit. 
(R. 1204-05). These determinations are not supported by the record. Thus, the Third District 
Court's failure to grant Pride's Motion to Amend was an abuse of discretion. 
In order to understand the nature of the Third District Court's error, this Court must 
understand how Pride proposed to amend its Complaint. First, the Amended Complaint 
restated Pride's First Cause of Action, breach of contract. Pride Stable did not substantially 
alter this Cause of Action except to specify that it was based on part performance for which 
the underlying facts had already been determined and for which the facts supporting such 
breach of implied contract based upon part performance had already been pled in the original 
Complaint. The Amended Complaint then added a Cause of Action for promissory estoppel. 
The Amended Complaint also collapsed two separate Causes of Action for interference with 
business relations into one claim for intentional interference with economic relations. The 
12
 Pride has already discussed the res judicata argument above. Accordingly, 
Pride will focus its argument on the Third District Court's belief that the Motion was 
untimely and defendants would be prejudiced by the amendment. 
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Amended Complaint reiterated Causes of Action for breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing and fraud which were pled in the original Complaint. Thus, the only "new" 
Cause of Action was for promissory estoppel. There were no other "new" Causes of Action. 
This is important because all allegations supporting the promissory estoppel Cause of Action 
and the breach of implied contract based upon part performance were included in the original 
Complaint. 
Specifically, in its Complaint, Pride made the following allegations: 
14. On or about March 9, 1988, Plaintiff informed Defendants (other than 
Valley) that, as a condition precedent to granting the permission requested by 
said Defendants to build the said Golf Course on portions of Plaintiffs 
property, Plaintiff needed sufficient funds to obtain the forbearance of Valley 
and other secured creditors from foreclosure during a period of two years or 
more during the construction of the golf course and pending the development 
and sale of Plaintiff s properties adjoining the proposed golf course. 
* # * 
15. During May and June of 1988, in reliance upon the representation of 
Defendants (other than Valley) that the loan of $185,000 would be made 
promptly, Plaintiff orally agreed with said Defendants to grant Homestead a 
license to construct a large portion of its proposed golf course upon portions 
of Plaintiff s properties in consideration of the said loan. 
* * * 
16. Based upon the said oral agreements . . . and in partial performance of 
said oral agreement, Plaintiffs' general partner executed a letter addressed to 
Midway City, Utah in the form prepared and requested by said Defendants . 
. . to assist him in obtaining a permit from the City of Midway for the 
construction of the said golf course, and Defendants did in fact use that letter 
to obtain a building permit and promptly thereafter began the construction of 
the golf course. 
* # * 
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17. [Defendants have failed and refused to perform the oral agreement to 
make the said loan and to execute the proposed written agreement and have 
failed and refused to provide Plaintiff with any part of said loan save and 
except for the sum of $5,000 which was advanced to Plaintiffs on or about 
July 7, 1988. 
* * * 
18. Notwithstanding the aforesaid . . . breach of the oral agreement by said 
Defendants . . . Defendants proceeded to occupy portions of Plaintiffs' lands 
and have entered into a series of contracts with third persons for construction 
work and materials and have induced and directed third persons to enter upon 
Plaintiffs' land and to construct substantial portions of Defendants' proposed 
golf course on Plaintiffs' land and have cut down trees, removed topsoil, 
created road, dug trenches, removed fences, re-contoured land, installed signs 
and utilized the property for the storage and use of construction equipment and 
materials. Said Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to take no 
immediate legal action against such intrusions and use of Plaintiffs' property 
by continuing to negotiate with Plaintiffs and by representing that their 
promises would be performed, but in fact said Defendants did not intend to 
perform the oral contract or to execute and perform the proposed written 
contract. 
* * * 
19. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants . . . have occupied and used 
large portions of Plaintiffs' properties without paying the agreed consideration, 
have damaged the property and, by reason of withholding the promised funds, 
have denied Plaintiff the ability to obtain a forbearance of its secured creditors 
in order to preclude foreclosure of the deeds of trust applicable to Plaintiffs' 
lands. 
* * * 
20. By reason of the foregoing Plaintiff was unable to provide its secured 
creditors with consideration for the forbearance of their rights to foreclose and 
Valley, despite its previous agreement to forebear if furnished consideration 
from the funds to be loaned by Defendant to Plaintiff, has foreclosed and 
purchased substantial portions of Plaintiff s property at foreclosure sales. 
(R. 5-8). The foregoing allegations from the original Complaint are all that is needed to 
support claims for breach of an implied contract based on part performance (the First Cause 
32 
of Action in the Amended Complaint) and promissory estoppel (the Second Cause of Action 
in Hit Amended Complaint). Defendants were clearly aware of the allegations and complaints 
made against them. The facts supporting these Causes of Action were not different from the 
facts alleged in the Complaint, and Defendants were not taken by surprise by any elements 
of these Causes of Action. The Amended Complaint merely added a Cause of Action based 
upon factual allegations known to the parties since the inception of the lawsuit. 
Under these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the Third District Court 
not to have granted Pride's Motion to Amend. As one court has stated "[djenial of leave to 
amend is generally considered an abuse of discretion where the amendment merely seeks to 
add a new legal theory supported by factual issues already in the case." Walls v. Arizona 
Dept. of Public Safety, 826 P.2d 1217,1223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Caglev. Carr, 418 
P.2d 381, 382-83 (Ariz. 1966)); see also Sherrardv. Stevens, 440 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Mich. Ct 
App. 1989) (per curiam) (concluding motion to amend appropriately granted when Amended 
Complaint did not add new factual allegations, "but merely claimed new types of damages 
arising from the same set of factual allegations"). Further, "'[m] ere delay '-the mere fact that 
the attempt to amend comes late-is not justification for denial of leave to amend.... 'Notice 
and substantial prejudice to the opposing party are critical factors in determining whether an 
amendment should be granted.'" Owen v. Superior Court of Arizona, 649 P.2d 278, 282 
(Ariz. 1982) (quoting Hageman v. SignalL. P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973). 
Pr: judice only occurs "when the amendment raises new issues or inserts new parties into the 
litigation." Id. The reason for this was enunciated by the United State Supreme Court: 
33 
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a 
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim 
on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as 
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the party of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue 
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, 
futility of the amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rales require, 
be "freely given." 
Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230 (1962). 
Further, both the Federal and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that a party 
is not prejudiced simply because a request to amend a Complaint comes late in the process. 
In fact, both allow for amendments into and through trial, in that they allow a party to amend 
its Complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b); Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(b). Clearly, lateness alone is not justification for refusing to grant a Motion to 
Amend. Taken together these cases and Rules dictate that a Motion to Amend a Complaint 
should not be denied when it merely seeks to add a legal theory already supported by the 
factual issues in a case or merely because it is late in a litigation. There must be some 
prejudice to the defendant. In this case, the Third District Court incorrectly concluded tihat 
Homestead would be prejudiced. As discussed, the Amended Complaint did not add any new 
substantive factual allegations which were not included in the original Complaint. All 
discovery has been conducted with those factual issues known to all parties. Pride has not 
asked that discovery be continued to find evidence to support their claims, nor is it aware of 
any discovery which would be needed regarding these claims. All applicable discovery 
regarding these Causes of Action has already been completed. 
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The "prejudice" relied upon by the Third District Court was the intervening death of 
Stroud. However, the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the Third District Court's 
determination that the death of L.L. Stroud and his inability to be deposed regarding the 
"new" or restated Causes of Action prejudiced the Defendants. Mr. Stroud was repeatedly 
deposed, both in the Federal Action and in the State Action, Mr. Stroud also testified in two 
trials in the Federal Action. All of this discovery and trial testimony was conducted in 
reference to the factual allegations pled by Pride in its original Complaint which states a 
prima facie case of promissory estoppel and breach of implied contract based upon part 
performance. Therefore, Defendants could not be prejudiced by the amendment because 
they can present Mr. Stroud's deposition and prior trial testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 804 
(b)(1) (allowing for use of testimony given in another hearing or proceeding if the party 
against whom the testimony is offered or predecessor in interest had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination). Accord In 
re: Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F.Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that deposition of 
deceased physician was admissible in another lawsuit against defendant who attended 
deposition and had opportunity, motive and intent to develop the physician's testimony). 
This is even more true in the instant case because Pride's claims for breach of contract 
and promissory estoppel are based upon the same facts set forth in the Complaint. See 
Valdez Fisheries Development Ass'n, Inc. v. Alaska Pipeline Service Co., 45 P.3d 657 at 666-
67 (Alaska 2002) (concluding in essence that when claims are based on same facts discovery 
concerning a promissory estoppel claim was same discovery that would be conducted into 
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breach of contract claim); Planning and Design Solutions v. City of Santa Fe, 885 P.2d 628 
at 636 (N.M. 1994) (concluding claims for promissory estoppel and breach of contract are 
very similar). The only difference between these two theories of recovery is whether the 
discussions and negotiations between the parties amounted to a bona fide contract or must 
be enforced upon some equitable doctrine. 
Simply put, there are no facts in the record which support the Third District Court's 
conclusion that the Defendants would be prejudiced as a result of Pride's Amended 
Complaint. Since it amounts to abuse of discretion to refuse a request to amend a Complaint 
unless there is some prejudice to the defendants, this Court should reverse the Third District 
Court's refusal to grant Pride's Motion to Amend and allow it to pursue its case to trial. Even 
if this Court were to conclude that a court within its discretion could refuse to grant a Motion 
to Amend based upon untimeliness without a showing of prejudice to Defendants, Pride's 
Motion to Amend was timely. Pride readily admits that the claims in this lawsuit were not 
actively litigated by either party during the 1990's. However, the reason for this inactivity 
is because the parties tacitly agreed to a stand still arrangement in which they would 
concentrate on pursuing only the claims involved in the Federal Action to determine if that 
litigation could lead to a resolution between the parties, while not wasting resources on two 
separate litigations. That is why there was no activity in this case in the years leading up to 
2002. 
The Third District Court also believed that the Motion was untimely because Pride 
did not seek to amend its Complaint until approximately one year after the Federal Action 
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ended. However, Pride needed time to re-evaluate its claims in light of the Tenth Circuit's 
decision and to re-evaluate the efficacy of moving forward. Once this was done, Pride filed 
its Motion to Amend, and at that time the case had not been set for trial. Defendants only 
claim of prejudice is the death of L.L. Stroud. However, Mr. Stroud passed away before the 
end of the Federal Action. Consequently, the additional one-year delay resulted in no 
prejudice to Defendants. 
Pride finds it ironic that while the Third District Court based its decision not to allow 
Pride to amend its Complaint because of the delay following the end of the Federal Action, 
it essentially allowed Defendants to amend their Answer to include a defense of res judicata. 
Prior to their Memorandum in Opposition to Pride's Motion to Amend, Defendants never 
raised the defense of res judicata. In fact, Defendants never even asked the Third District 
Court for permission to amend, as did Pride. Homestead simply asserted res judicata in 
response to Pride's Motion to Amend. Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the Third District Court to conclude that Pride's Motion to Amend was 
untimely, while also concluding that Homestead timely raised the res judicata defense 
despite the fact that Defendants never sought to amend their Answer in the months following 
the Federal Action.13 
13
 Similarly, as discussed above, Defendants should have been judicially estopped 
from raising res judicata as a defense and in opposition to Pride's Motion to Amend due 
to the fact that Pride attempted to litigate all claims over all properties in the Federal 
Action by way of Counterclaim, and Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Pride's 
Counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Bankruptcy Court 
granted that Motion. "It is well settled that a party who has taken a position in a prior 
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For these reasons, the Third District Court abused its discretion in denying Pride's 
Motion to Amend its Complaint. Pride should be allowed to amend its Complaint and 
resolve the issues in this case on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Third District Court's Order granting Homestead's 
Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the doctrine of res judicata. This Court should 
also issue an Order reversing the Third District Court's denial of Pride's Cross-Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and directing that partial summary judgment be entered as a 
matter of law in favor of Pride on its Causes of Action for breach of implied contract based 
uj on part performance, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, leaving only the issue of damages for trial on these claims. Finally, if 
claims for implied contract and promissory estoppel are not included in Pride's original 
Complaint, this Court should reverse the Third District Court's Order denying Pride's 
Motion for Leave to Amend. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Due to the complexity of the issues presented in this case, Pride believes that oral 
argument is necessary to aid the Court in reaching its decision. 
litigation and has obtained relief on the basis of it cannot maintain the opposite position 
in another action." Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980). 
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DATED this 17th day of Januaiy, 2003. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
r. /^V 
ichael W. Homer 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of January, 2003,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Pride Stables to be served by first-class United 
States mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
Steven B. Mitchell, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103 
(801)355-6677 
By. 
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SALT ra \a iputy Cterl 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOMESTEAD GOLF CLUB, INC., et 
al, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890907511 CV 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Homestead Golf Club, 
Inc. and Gerald R. Sanders, and Plaintiff Pride Stables' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, came on for hearing before the court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Judge, 
on July 2, 2002. Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge & Mitchell appeared on behalf of 
Defendants. Jesse Trentadue of Suitter Axland appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Pride 
Stables. The court heard extensive argument of counsel and took the matter under 
advisement. 
The Court, having read and considered the papers filed in connection with the 
motion and having heard the argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises, 
and having previously issued a Minute Entry granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denying Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is, entered dismissing 
Plaintiffs Complaint on file herein including specifically the First, Seventh, Eighth and 
Ninth Causes of Action, with prejudice and upon the merits. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this _^\ day of ^ ^ ( ~ 2002. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, on the "2iirc&y of August, 2002: 
Michael W. Homer, Esq. 
Jesse Trentadue, Esq. 
J. Rand Hirschi, Esq. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
2 
John G. Marshall, Esq. 
MARSHALL & WILLIS 
3945 Wasatch Blvd., #292 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
C \jg\HOMESTEAD\SUMMARY JUDGMENT wpd 
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Third Judicial District 
MAY 13 2002 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1103 
(801)355-6677 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited 
partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HOMESTEAD GOLF CLUB, INC., 
FRANK SHANNON, GERALD R. 
SANDERS, L.L. STROUD, BRITT A. 
MATHWICH, HENRY A. WEEKS, 
MICHAEL J. HUNT, FARIDA, N.V., a 
Netherlands Antilles Corporation, 
GREAT INNS OF THE ROCKIES, 
INC., a Nevada Corporation, VALLEY 
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Defendants. 
/ \ Deputy cjprk 
ORDER 
Civil No. 890907511 CV 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint came on for 
hearing before the court, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, Judge, on April 8, 2002. Jesse 
C. Trentadue and Michael W. Homer of Suitter, Axland appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. 
Richard D. Burbidge and Stephen B. Mitchell of Burbidge & Mitchell appeared on behalf 
of Defendants. After having heard the argument of counsel, the court took the matter 
under advisement. 
The court now being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing 
therefore and having issued its Minute Entry denying the motion, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint shall be, and 
the same hereby is, denied. The court determines that the motion is untimely and that the 
untimeliness has prejudiced Defendants. Further, the decision of the United States Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Homestead Golf Club, Inc. v. Pride Stables, Case 
No. 98-4211, is res judicata with respect to all of the proposed amended causes of action 
and bars such claims. The Tenth Circuit ruled that no agreement for a loan existed 
between Plaintiff and Homestead Golf Club, Inc. because there had never been a meeting 
of the minds on the terms of the agreement and at best the parties' discussions had only 
been an agreement to agree. 
2 
DATED this 1 3 day of ^AM 2002. 
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BY THE COURT: 
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the following, postage prepaid, on the 3o day of April, 2002: 
Michael W. Homer, Esq. 
Jesse Trentadue, Esq. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
HOMESTEAD GOLF CLUB, INC., a Utah 
corporation, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
PRIDE STABLES, a Utah limited partnership, 
Appellant and Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, Third-Party 
Defendant. 
Nos. 98-4211, 98-4217. 
Sept 12,2000. 
After owner of tracts of property located near 
resort filed bankruptcy petition, corporation formed 
for purposes of constructing golf course at resort 
filed adversary proceeding seeking declaration that 
it had right to use tracts for construction of golf 
course, pursuant to agreement with owner. After 
judgment for owner was reversed by District Court, 
and subsequent judgment for corporation was also 
reversed, the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the District of Utah dismissed complaint. Appeal 
was taken, and the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Bruce S. Jenkins, J., affirmed. 
Cross- appeals were taken. The Court of Appeals, 
Lucero, Circuit Judge, held that purported oral 
agreement between parties, under which owner 
granted license allowing construction on its 
property in exchange for loan allowing owner to 
obtain forbearance from its secured creditors on one 
of tracts, did not create an enforceable contract 
under Utah law. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Bankruptcy €=>3771 
51k3771 Most Cited Cases 
While general rule is that a party cannot appeal 
from a judgment in his favor, rule is not absolute, 
and where a judgment gives the successful party 
only part of that which he seeks and denies him the 
balance, with the result that injustice has been done 
him, he may appeal from the entire judgment. 
[2] Bankruptcy €==>3771 
51k3771 Most Cited Cases 
Determination by district court in breach of contract 
action that no enforceable contract had existed 
between parties could be appealed by defendant, as 
it would collaterally estop defendant in his state 
court action against plaintiff. 
[3] Bankruptcy €^>3782 
51k3782 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Bankruptcy €=>3786 
51k3786 Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing a district court's decision in its 
capacity as bankruptcy appellate court, Court of 
Appeals applies the clear error standard to findings 
of fact, and the de novo standard to its conclusions 
of law. 
[4] Bankruptcy €=^3786 
51k3786 Most Cited Cases 
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without 
factual support in the record, or if, after reviewing 
all of the evidence, Court of Appeals is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. 
[5] Bankruptcy €^=>3786 
51k3786 Most Cited Cases 
It is especially important for Court of Appeals to be 
faithful to the clearly erroneous standard when the 
bankruptcy court's findings have been upheld by the 
district court. 
[6] Bankruptcy €=>3782 
5 lk3782 Most Cited Cases 
[6] Contracts €=>29 
95k29 Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, the existence of a valid, 
enforceable contract is a question of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness. 
[7] Contracts €=^28(1) 
95k28(l) Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, burden of proving the existence of 
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2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246 
(Cite as: 224 R3d 1195) 
a contract is on the party seeking enforcement of it. 
[8] Contracts €=>9(1) 
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases 
[8] Contracts €==>32 
95k32 Most Cited Cases 
Purported oral agreement between corporation 
organized for purposes of constructing golf course 
on property adjacent to resort, and owner of nearby 
tracts on which portion of course was to be built, 
under which owner granted license allowing 
construction on its property in exchange for loan 
allowing owner to obtain forbearance from its 
secured creditors on one of tracts, did not create an 
enforceable contract under Utah law; important 
material terms, such as funding date, interest rate, 
and payment schedule were not determined, and it 
was not e^en clear which property lease supported 
proposed loan, and while parties had intended that 
agreement be reduced to writing and executed, they 
did not do so. 
[9] Contracts €=>9(1) 
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases 
[9] Contracts €=>15 
95kl5 Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, a condition precedent to the 
enforcement of any contract is that there be a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with 
sufficient definiteness to be enforced. 
[10] Contracts €=>15 
95kl5 Most Cited Cases 
Contractual mutual assent under Utah law requires 
assent by all parties to the same thing in the same 
sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms. 
[11] Contracts €==>147(2) 
95k 147(2) Most Cited Cases 
[11] Evidence €==>461(1) 
157k461(l) Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, the intentions of the parties to a 
contract will normally be found from the instrument 
itself, but where the parties did not execute a written 
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contract, resort may be had to extraneous evidence 
manifesting the intentions of the parties. 
[12j Contracts €=>25 
95k25 Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, if the parties intend to negotiate 
further the terms of an agreement, a manifestation 
of willingness to enter into the agreement is only 
preliminary, and does not demonstrate the existence 
of a binding contract. 
[13] Bankruptcy €=>3779 
51k3779 Most Cited Cases 
[13] Federal Civil Procedure €=1939 
170Akl939 Most Cited Cases 
Pre-trial orders measure the dimensions of the 
lawsuit, both in the trial court and on appeal. 
[14] Contracts €=>9(1) 
95k9(l) Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, where a court cannot determine 
what the rights of the parties would be under a 
purported contractual agreement, it cannot enforce 
that agreement. 
[15] Bankruptcy €=?3779 
51k3779 Most Cited Cases 
District court has the authority to affirm a 
bankruptcy court's decision on an alternative ground 
supported by the record. 
[16] Estoppel C=?87 
156k87 Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, detrimental reliance may allow a 
remedy where no formal contract exists. 
[17] Bankruptcy €=>3777 
51k3777 Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals would not consider argument 
which party utterly failed to support with legal 
authority. 
[18] Estoppel €=>52.15 
156k52.15 Most Cited Cases 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246 
(Cite as: 224 F.3d 1195) 
Under Utah law, conduct by one party which leads 
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course 
of action resulting in detriment or damage if the 
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct may 
constitute equitable estoppel. 
[19] Estoppel €=>85 
156k85 Most Cited Cases 
[19] Estoppel €=>87 
156k87 Most Cited Cases 
[19] Frauds, Statute Of €=>144 
185kl44 Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, a mere promise to execute a 
written contract and a subsequent refusal to do so is 
insufficient to create an estoppel, although reliance 
is placed on such a promise and damage is sustained 
as a consequence of the refusal. 
[20] Estoppel €=^87 
156k87 Most Cited Cases 
Under Utah law, mere reliance by owner of tracts of 
property located near resort on which golf course 
was to be built on promise by corporation organized 
for purposes of constructing course to execute 
written contract memorializing oral agreement 
between parties, under which owner granted license 
allowing construction of course on its property in 
exchange for loan allowing owner to obtain 
forbearance from its secured creditors on one of 
tracts, was insufficient to create an estoppel. 
*1197 Stephen B. Mitchell (Richard D. Burbidge 
with him on the briefs), Burbidge & Mitchell, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for the appellee and cross-
appellant. 
John G. Marshall, Marshall & Willis, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, for the appellant and cross-appellee. 
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, 
Senior Circuit Judge, and ALLEY, Senior District 
Judge. [FN*] 
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LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 
[1][2] After approximately ten years of litigation 
regarding an oral agreement to construct a portion 
of a golf course by plaintiff-appellee Homestead 
Golf Club, Inc. ("HGC") on property owned by 
defendant-appellant Pride Stables ("Pride"), 
allegedly in exchange for a loan, the district court 
decided that the parties had not created an 
enforceable contract and dismissed the case. 
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
158(d) and 1291, we affirm. [FN1] 
FN1. We requested supplemental briefing 
on the question of whether Pride has 
standing to appeal the order of the district 
court when it prevailed on the merits. 
"While it is the general rule that a party 
cannot appeal from a judgment in his 
favor, the rule is not absolute, and where a 
judgment gives the successful party only 
part of that which he seeks and denies him 
the balance, with the result that injustice 
has been done him, he may appeal from 
the entire judgment." See J amis v. 
Nobel/Sysco Food Sews. Co., 985 F.2d 
1419, 1424 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Barnes-Manley Wet 
Wash Laundiy Co., 168 F.2d 381, 386 
(10th Cir.1948)); cf. Lopez v. Behles (In 
re American Ready Mix, Inc.), 14 F.3d 
1497, 1500 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that 
parties are "aggrieved" by a bankruptcy 
court's decision "if the order ... diminishes 
their property, increases their burdens, or 
impairs their rights" (internal quotation 
and citation omitted)). Because the 
district court's decision that no valid 
contract existed between the parties will 
collaterally estop Pride in its state court 
action against HGC, we conclude that 
Pride is entitled to appeal the judgment of 
the district court. 
*1198I 
FN* The Honorable Wayne E. Alley, 
Senior District Judge, United States 
District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 
HGC was organized to construct a golf course on 
property adjacent to the Homestead Resort in 
Midway, Utah. Pride owned a fifty-percent interest 
in the property on which the fourteenth hole of the 
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golf course was to be built (the "fourteenth hole 
property"), as well as a fifty-percent interest in other 
property co-owned by Cal Clark on which other 
portions of the golf course were to be constructed 
(the "Clark-Pride property"). In 1987, HGC and 
Pride began negotiating the construction of portions 
of this golf course on Pride's property. By Spring 
1988, however, Pride was in default on loans 
secured by the Clark-Pride property from Valley 
Bank & Trust Co. ("Valley Bank"), Davis County 
Bank ("DCB"), and Crossland Savings & Loan 
("Crossland") and was pursuing forbearance 
agreements with some of these lenders to forestall 
foreclosure proceedings. 
On May 9, 1988, Pride purportedly granted an oral 
license to allow HGC to construct the golf course 
on portions of its property in exchange for a loan of 
$185,000—an amount Pride needed to obtain 
forbearance from its secured creditors on the 
Clark-Pride property. Notably, the parties dispute 
whether the loan related only to HGC's use of the 
Clark-Pride property or whether it related to HGC's 
use of both the Clark-Pride and fourteenth hole 
properties. 
Pending written documentation of this oral 
agreement, Pride and the other property owners 
signed a letter of commitment on June 15, 1988, 
permitting HGC to begin construction of the golf 
course on the fourteenth hole property. The letter 
of commitment stated: 
We ... give this letter of commitment to the City 
of Midway ... for the purpose of issuing a 
building permit to [HGC]. By this letter we 
indicate our commitment to granting to [HGC] an 
appropriate easement or license over the property 
... for the purpose of their developing a golf 
course in Midway, Utah. The underlying 
agreements between the parties necessary to make 
such a commitment have been reached in 
principle and are awaiting final documentation, 
which is expected to be prepared and signed 
within the next two weeks. As such, we have no 
objection to the granting of a construction permit 
to [HGC] for the purpose of beginning 
construction on the proposed golf course in 
Midway, Utah. 
(II Appellant's App. at 576.) During the next 
month, the City of Midway granted the permit, and 
HGC began construction. HGC also gave Pride's 
General Partner, Robert Condie, a check in the 
amount of $5,000 payable to Condie and Crossland. 
Despite the letter of commitment, the parties were 
unable to agree in writing on the terms of their oral 
agreement. In August, Pride received a proposed 
license agreement from HGC for the Clark-Pride 
property and a promissory note for $185,000. 
HGC prepared a separate license agreement for the 
fourteenth hole property. Pride did not sign either 
of the license agreements. In the face of threatened 
foreclosure, Pride requested a modification of the 
loan and its payment, but HGC alleges it would not 
agree to the modifications unless Pride obtained 
agreements from its lenders to subordinate their 
loans to the license granted to HGC. Creditors 
would not sign the subordination agreements, and 
HGC refused to make the modified loans. 
Seeking a declaration that it had the right to use the 
fourteenth hole property, HGC filed this adversary 
proceeding against Pride on April 28, 1989 in 
bankruptcy court. Pride had filed a petition under 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 
May 1987, and a plan of reorganization had been 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court in March 1988. 
After trial on HGC's complaint, the bankruptcy 
court entered judgment in favor of Pride. On 
appeal, the district court reversed and remanded, 
finding insufficient evidence in the record to 
support the bankruptcy court's conclusion that HGC 
*1199 had breached the May 9, 1988 agreement in 
December of that year by failing to fund the 
proposed loan. 
On remand, the bankruptcy court entered judgment 
for HGC, but on further appeal the district court 
again remanded, this time for consideration of 
"unresolved factual issues" that the bankruptcy 
court had failed to address. [FN2] After an 
evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court entered 
judgment for Pride and dismissed HGC's complaint, 
finding that HGC had anticipatorily repudiated the 
parties' loan agreement in September 1988. 
FN2. Specifically, the district court 
instructed the bankruptcy court to consider 
whether HGC had repudiated the May 91 
1988 agreement in September 1988. 
On appeal for the third time, the district court 
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affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of HGC's 
complaint, but on alternative grounds. Without 
reversing the determination of the bankruptcy court 
that HGC had anticipatorily breached the 
agreement, the district court held that dismissal of 
HGC's complaint was required because no 
enforceable contract existed. Pride filed a motion 
to amend the judgment to alter the district court's 
holding that the parties did not create an 
enforceable contract, which the district court 
denied. The parties filed cross-appeals from the 
district court's judgment. [FN3] 
FN3. HGC has also filed a Motion for 
Leave to File Supplemental Appendix to 
Reply Brief, which we grant. 
n 
[3][4][5][6][7] Reviewing a district court's decision 
in its capacity as bankruptcy appellate court, we 
apply the clear error standard to a bankruptcy 
court's findings of fact and the de novo standard to 
its conclusions of law. See Phillips v. White (In re 
White), 25 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.1994). "A 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without 
factual support in the record or if, after reviewing 
all of the evidence, we are left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Conoco, Inc. v. Styler (In re Peterson Distrib., Inc.), 
82 F.3d 956, 959 (10th Cir.1996). "It is especially 
important to be faithful to the clearly erroneous 
standard when the bankruptcy court's findings have 
been upheld by the district court." Osborn v. 
Durant Bank & Trust Co., 24 F.3d 1199, 1203 
(10th Cir.1994). Under Utah law, the existence of 
a valid, enforceable contract is a question of law 
which we review for "correctness." John Deere Co. 
v. A & H Equip., Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 883 
(Utah.App. 1994); see also Herm Hughes & Sons, 
Inc. v. Quintet, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah 
CtApp.1992). [FN4] "The burden of proving the 
existence of a contract is on the party seeking 
enforcement of it." Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 
1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (citing B & R Supply Co. v. 
Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 
(1972)). 
FN4. Contrary to Pride's assertions, the 
Copr. © West 2003 No < 
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district court did not violate the clear error 
standard for review of the bankruptcy 
court's factual findings by holding that the 
May 9, 1988 agreement is unenforceable 
because, as noted, whether an enforceable 
contract exists is a question of law. 
A 
[8][9][10] The parties dispute whether their oral 
agreement of May 9, 1988 is an enforceable 
contract. "A condition precedent to the 
enforcement of any contract is that there be a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with 
sufficient definiteness to be enforced." [FN5] 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427, 
428 (1961). "[Contractual mutual assent requires 
assent by all parties to the same thing in the same 
sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms." 
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 
(Utah 1978); see also Sadder v. Savin, 897 P.2d 
1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to *1200 
form an enforceable contract, there must be a 
meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the 
agreement). 
FN5. Because a condition precedent to the 
enforcement of an agreement is a finding 
of fact that there was a meeting of the 
minds sufficient to form an enforceable 
contract, the district court's holding that no 
enforceable contract existed is not, as 
Pride contends, surplusage to its decision. 
[11] Normally, the intentions of the parties "will be 
found from the instrument itself," but where, as 
here, the parties did not execute a written contract, 
"resort may be had to extraneous evidence 
manifesting the intentions of the parties." 
Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1386. The focus of our 
inquiry is the oral discussion on May 9, 1988, 
during which Pride purportedly granted a license to 
allow HGC to construct the golf course on portions 
of Pride's property in exchange for a $185,000 loan. 
Based on its examination of the evidence of the 
oral agreement, the district court concluded that 
"[i]mportant material terms such as the funding 
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date, interest rate, and payment schedule ... were not 
determined at that time." (I Appellant's App. at 
293.) Not only were important terms left open, but 
it is not even clear which property lease supported 
the proposed loan. HGC claims the loan related 
only to the Clark-Pride property, but Pride alleges 
the loan was supported by HGC's use of both the 
Clark-Pride and the fourteenth hole properties. If 
"there was simply some nebulous notion in the air 
that a contract might be entered into in the future, 
the court cannot fabricate the kind of a contract the 
parties ought to have made and enforce it." 
Valcarce, 362 P.2d at 428-29 (citation omitted). 
We conclude this is the situation present here. 
Because the parties did not ultimately memorialize 
their oral agreement, we must inquire beyond the 
verbal discussions into the attempts at written 
documentation. The aforementioned letter of 
commitment regarding the fourteenth hole property 
was signed by Pride and stated in relevant part: 
By this letter we indicate our commitment to 
granting to [HGC] an appropriate easement or 
license over the property.... The underlying 
agreements between the parties necessary to make 
such a commitment have been reached in 
principle and are awaiting final documentation, 
which is expected to be prepared and signed 
within the next two weeks. As such, we have no 
objection to the granting of a construction 
permit.... 
(II Appellant's App. at 576.) In addition, as 
detailed above, HGC prepared and sent to Pride a 
license agreement and a promissory note in the 
amount of $185,000 for the Clark-Pride property 
and prepared a separate license agreement for the 
fourteenth hole property. As we have noted, Pride 
did not sign either of the license agreements. The 
license agreements and the promissory note are of 
limited value in determining the parties' intent 
because they were never signed or executed. 
Moreover, the letter of commitment did not specify 
the terms of the oral agreement and stated explicitly 
the parties' intent to document the details of their 
arrangement in writing at a later time. 
Conceding that no formal agreements "were ever 
signed by the parties," Pride nevertheless asserts 
that the missing material terms of the parties' 
agreement were actually contained in the record on 
appeal. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) Condie, who was 
negotiating on behalf of Pride, testified that the 
terms of the loan, including the interest rate, the 
payback of the loan, and the purported use of the 
funds to gain forbearance from foreclosure, were 
discussed on May 9, 1988, as well as the 
"dedication or use of [Pride's] property for the golf 
course" as a "condition of that loan." (II 
Appellant's App. at 382-85.) But this argument did 
not make it onto the green because Condie also 
testified that the "next step ... after that meeting" 
was that "[t]he documents would be prepared to put 
into writing the understanding." (Id. at 387.) 
[12] If the parties intend to negotiate further the 
terms of an agreement, a manifestation of 
willingness to enter into the agreement is only 
preliminary, and does not demonstrate the existence 
of a binding contract. See Sackler, 897 P.2d at 
1221-22. For example, in *1201Crismon v. 
Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 
1222 (Utah Ct.App. 1987), a letter indicated that 
"the parties were still negotiating ... [, defendant's] 
legal department would be sending a prepared 
lease[, and] ... both parties understood that a 
binding contract would be entered into in the 
future." The parties then exchanged proposed 
leases, which the Utah Court of Appeals held 
"clearly demonstrates that they did not have a 
meeting of the minds as to all of the essential terms 
of the lease." Id. at 1222. In the instant case, the 
letter of commitment evidences that same 
intention—to prepare written documentation of the 
parties' understanding which would then constitute 
the binding contract. That intention was precisely 
what the bankruptcy court found: "The parties 
intended that their agreement be reduced to writing 
and executed." (I Appellant's App. at 273.) HGC 
drafted this documentation, but Pride did not sign it. 
All that the parties consummated on May 9, 1988 
was an agreement to agree, which is "unenforceable 
because [it] leave[s] open material terms for future 
consideration, and the courts cannot create these 
terms for the parties." Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 
P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979) (citing 17 Am.Jur.2d 
362 Contracts § 26 (1991) (further citations 
omitted)). 
[ 13 ] [ 14] [ 15] Notwithstanding uncertainty 
regarding the terms of the loan, Pride argues that 
the terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they 
provide a basis for determining the existence of a 
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) (1979). 
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But this argument lands Pride in a bunker: Like the 
district court, we are at a loss to determine what that 
remedy would be, because we are unable to 
determine the rights of the respective parties under 
the agreement. [FN6] As explained by the district 
court, "[t]he record does not indicate which party 
was to perform first ... [or] what the required 
performance was: Did the agreement call for Pride 
to sign the promissory note and obtain licenses 
before the loan would be funded, as HGC suggests, 
or was HGC to fund the loan first before obtaining 
either the licenses or subordinations?" (I 
Appellant's App. at 292.) Furthermore, the 
complaint at issue sought a declaration of rights 
pertaining to the fourteenth hole property, but the 
parties dispute whether the oral loan agreement 
related to that property or, as HGC contends, 
related only to the Clark-Pride property. [FN7] We 
will not speculate as to the parties' intentions 
regarding a lease or easement for the fourteenth 
hole property. Where, as here, we cannot determine 
what the rights of the parties would be under an 
agreement, we cannot enforce that agreement. [FN8] 
See Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1387. 
FN6. Pre-trial orders measure the 
dimensions of the lawsuit, both in the trial 
court and on appeal. See American Home 
Assurance Co. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 551 
F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir.1977). Pride 
asserts for the first time in its reply brief 
that we are bound by the parties' 
stipulation in the pre-trial order that "[o]n 
or about May 9, 1988[HGC] and [Pride] 
orally agreed that [HGC] would lend 
[Pride] the sum of $185,000 so that [Pride] 
could make payment to certain of its 
creditors." (I Appellant's App. at 183-84.) 
The district court's holding that the oral 
agreement is not sufficiently definite to 
form a contract is not contrary to this 
stipulation. 
FN7. Because the scope of the complaint 
and subsequent findings of the bankruptcy 
court are limited to the fourteenth hole 
property, we do not address whether the 
parties entered mto an agreement or 
contract relative to the Clark-Pride 
property. Our decision therefore does not 
preclude any pending or future actions 
involving claims relevant only to the 
Clark-Pride property. 
FN8. Pride claims that it is entitled to a 
finding of an enforceable contract pursuant 
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), which states in 
relevant part that "every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled." 
This claim is without merit because the 
district court has the authority to affirm the 
bankruptcy court's decision on an 
alternative ground supported by the record. 
See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 
997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir.1993). 
Likewise, Pride's reliance in its reply brief 
on Brown v. Gurney, 201 U.S. 184, 190, 
26 S.Ct. 509, 50 L.Ed. 717 (1906), is 
misplaced. The Supreme Court in Brown 
held that "where the existence of certain 
facts is assumed in the trial court and the 
trial proceeds, without objection, on that 
assumption, and the case is decided in 
reliance thereon, neither party will be 
heard in the court of review to question ... 
the existence of the facts." However, the 
instant case is distinguishable because 
whether the agreement constitutes an 
enforceable contract is a question of law, 
not of fact. 
*1202 B 
[16] Pride would have us ignore the missing 
elements in its documentation that make the 
contract unenforceable by arguing that it fully 
performed in allowing HGC to construct its golf 
course, but that HGC refused to fund the loan 
knowing that failure to do so could result in 
foreclosure on Pride's property. According to 
Pride, allowing HGC to retain the benefit of the 
bargain, while denying Pride the opportunity to 
recover the damages it incurred due to HGC's 
breach of the agreement on the grounds of 
indefiniteness, would be inequitable. [FN9] 
FN9. We do not address the merits of 
Pride's reply brief contention that it is 
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entitled to relief pursuant to the doctrines 
enunciated in Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts §§ 34 and 69(2) (1979). See 
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 99 A F.2d 
716, 724 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that 
issues raised for the first time in the reply 
brief will not be considered). Ordinarily, 
detrimental reliance might allow a remedy 
where no formal contract exists, or, 
alternatively, partial performance such as 
occurred here might support a finding of 
an enforceable contract. See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 34 (1979). Pride, 
however, did not advance arguments based 
on these theories until its reply brief, 
although it did place in play the doctrinally 
independent concept of equitable estoppel. 
[17] Pride tees its argument on 17 Am.Jur.2d 
Contracts § 193(1991): 
The determination that an agreement is 
sufficiently definite is favored. Rejection of a 
contract for indefiniteness is, at best, a last resort. 
Therefore, courts will, if possible, so construe the 
agreement as to carry into effect the reasonable 
intention of the parties, if that can be ascertained. 
In other words, in interpreting doubtful 
agreements a court will, if possible, attach a 
sufficiently definite meaning to a bargain of 
parties who evidently intended to enter into a 
binding contract. The law leans against the 
destruction of contracts for uncertainty, 
particularly where one of the parties has 
performed part of the contract. 
Pride contends that even if the oral agreement in 
its original conception was unenforceable, the fact 
that HGC acted on this agreement by constructing 
the golf course, in addition to fronting Pride Stables 
$5,000 of the agreed-on $185,000 loan, constitutes 
an acceptance of the bargain. [FN 10] 
FN 10. As an alternative basis for finding 
injury, Pride argues that Lem Stroud, who 
negotiated on behalf of HGC, admitted that 
he had a fiduciary duty and made 
representations to Pride that if it would 
contribute its property, it would be 
"morally, legally and otherwise protected 
in their dealings." (Appellant's Br. at 17 
(citing Appellant's App. at 333-34).) We 
donot consider this argument because 
Pride has utterly failed to support it with 
legal authority. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 
956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.1992) 
(holding that a party must support its 
argument with legal authority). 
[18][19][20] It is true that HGC began construction 
of the course in June 1988 and gave Condie a check 
in the amount of $5,000 payable to Condie and 
Crossland the following month. It is also true that 
"conduct by one party which leads another party, in 
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action 
resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate his conduct" may constitute 
equitable estoppel. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985). But Pride 
fails to drive the point home, because "a mere 
promise to execute a written contract and a 
subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create 
an estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a 
promise and damage is sustained as a consequence 
of the refusal." F.C. Stangl, III v. Ernst Home Ctr., 
Inc., 948 P.2d 356, 365 (Utah Ct.App.1997) 
(quoting McKinnon v. The Corp. of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter-Day Saints, 
529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974)). Pride merely 
relied on HGC's promise to execute a written 
contract, which is insufficient to create an estoppel. 
*1203 C 
In its conclusion, the district court stated: "It 
appears that the loan agreement, as contemplated byj 
the parties, more closely resembled a Monet—an 
impressionist rendering fashioned as the thoughts 
occurred to them—rather than a Manet of detailed 
execution." (I Appellant's App. Doc. 19 at 11) 
(citing United States v. Cropper, 42 F.3d 755, 759 
(2d Cir.1994).) But it is the surreal nature of the 
parties' conduct that we find remarkable. As noted 
by the district court, "[w]hy any business would 
begin developing a golf course on land it had no 
ownership interest in, without first securing written 
permission to use the land on terms that required a 
definite performance and secured that interest, is 
beyond the comprehension of this Court." (1 
Appellant's App. Doc. 19 at 8.) We fault the district 
court only in its choice of artistic metaphor— 
Impressionism rather than Surrealism-but 
otherwise take its view of the matter. 
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VIII 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
224 F.3d 1195, 2000 CJ C.A.R. 5246 
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